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CERTIORARI AS USED BY THE SUPREME

COURT IN THE INTEREST OF HARMONY OF OPINION AND UNIFORMITY OF THE LAW.
I
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
It is not my purpose to discuss the writ of certiorari in general, but only such writ as used by the Supreme Court and as
directed to the several Courts of Appeals in the interest of harmony of the case law of the state. But whilst this is the purpose I have in mind, yet some general thoughts are not inappropriate.
In Missouri we have no general statutes covering the subject of certiorari, as we have covering prohibition, mandamus,
habeas corpus and quo warranto. In most respects we use the
writ as recognized at common law, and it is no doubt true that
when the constitution of 1875, sec. 3 of art. VI, speaks of certiorari, it was used in the common law sense of that term. In many
states, by statute the old common law writ has been curtailed,
and in others enlarged. And in England Acts of Parliament
have changed in some things the old common law certiorari.
Even in Missouri we have some statutes providing for certiorari
in given cases. Section 3031 R. S. Mo., 1919, provides for the
removal 'by certiorari of proceedings in the courts of Justice of
the Peace to the Circuit Court in cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Section 7336, R. S. Mo., 1919, allows the physician whose license to practice has been revoked by the State
Board of Health to proceed by certiorari to the Circuit Court.
So also the Public Service Commission Act, Laws of 1913, secs.
111-113, p. 641, provides for a species of certiorari. But outside
of a few statutes of the character named, this state has the common law writ of certiorari. It has no doubt been modified in a
way by case made law. This writ has been defined in Bacon's
Abridgment, Vol. 1, p. 559 (5th Ed.) thus:
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"Certiorari is an original writ issuing out of Chancery, or
the King's Bench, directed in the King's name, to the judges or
officers of inferior courts commanding them to return the records of a cause depending before them, to the end the party may
have the more sure and speedy justice before him, or such other
justices as he shall assign to determine the cause."
Tidd's Practice gives this definition:
"A certiorari is a writ issued from a superior court to an
inferior court, tribunal or officer exercising judicial powers,
whose poceedings are summary or in a course different from
the common law, commanding the latter to return the records of
a cause pending before it to the superior court."
Bailey in Vol. 1, p. 621, gives this idea of the writ from the
American view point:
"The purpose of the writ is to have the entire record of the
inferior tribunal brought before the superior court, to determine
whether the former had jurisdiction or had exceeded its jurisdiction or had failed to proceed according to the essential requirements of the law."
At common law it was not a writ of right, but its issuance
was within the discretion of the court to which application was
made.1 And so far as Missouri is concerned, the common law
writ of certiorari may be classed as a discretionary writ, rather
than a writ of right. Its purpose is not to take the place of an
appeal or writ of error, but to reach those cases where there is
no appeal or writ of error. At common law there was no appeal,
but there was a writ of error, and as a rule the writ of certiorari
would not be ganted where a writ of error could have been invoked. The writ, so far as used in this state, is not designed to
bring up for consideration mere errors in the course of a trial,
such as are heard upon appeal or writ of error. The purpose is
to bring to the superior court the record of the inferior court
to the end that it may be determined whether or not the inferior
court was without jurisdiction, or if it had jurisdiction, whether
or not it has proceeded according to law, and kept within that
1.

Harris on Certiorari, sec. 3, p. 4.
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jurisdiction. 2 At common law, in England, and even in this state
the writ has been used to bring up a case to be tried upon its ;ner4
its in a higher court.3 And the case was determined there.
There was, however, a statute which authorized the transfer, if
such statute was constitutional. The constitutionality of the statute was raised butthe writ seems to have been granted upon
common law rules.
In the Dawson case, supra, Black, J., used language which
perhaps is better than ours upon this point, and I quote thus:
"But it cannot be said that the writ will be issued only in
those cases where the lower court has no jurisdiction whatever
over the case before it. High says: 'The province of the writ
is not necessarily confined to cases where the subordinate court
is absolutely devoid of jurisdiction, .but is also extended to cases
where such tribunal, although rightfully entertaining jurisdiction
of the subject-matter in controversy, has exceeded its legitimate
powers'."
Judge Black had before him a case in prohibition, but in
State ex rel v. Smith5 the Supreme Court applied the same doctrine in certiorari. I may add that what can be reached by prohibition before the lower tribunal acts may be reached by certiorari after the court has acted.
It is perhaps needless to say that such writ only brings up
the record of the lower court or tribunal for review by the superior court". And usually this is after a final disposition of the
case in the lower court.
With these general observations, I shall proceed to the real
subject I have in mind, i. e. the writ of certiorari, as used by
the Supreme Court of Missouri in the interest of harmony of
opinions and uniformity of the law.
2. State ex rel. Dawson v. St. Louis Court of Appeals (1889) 99
Mo. 1. c. 221, 12 S. W. 661; State ex rel. v. Smith (1903) 176 Mo. 1. c. 99,
75 S. W. 586.
3. Rector v. Price (1822) 1 Mo. 198.
4. Rector's Adne'r. v. Price (1823) 1 Mo. 373.
5. (1903) 176 Mo. 1. c. 99, 75 S. W. 586.
6 State ex rel. v. Smith (1903) 176 Mo. 1. c. 99, 75 S. W. 586.

LAW SERIES 24, MissouRI BULLETIN

II
HISTORY OF THE WRIT
The writ of certiorari as now used for the review of opinions of the several Courts of Appeals has had a somewhat checkered career. The Supreme Court first asserted this right in the
case of State ex rel. Curtis v. Broaddus'. Prior to that time it
had not asserted it, but on the other hand had denied'the right.
The cases will be found collected in the dissenting opinion of
Bond, J., in State ex rel. v. Robertson". These earlier cases were
mostly mandamus or prohibition cases, but after the constitu-

tional amendment of 1884, certiorari was specifically denied inf
State ex rel. v. Smith et al.9 Shortly thereafter, however, there was a vigorous dissent to the first ruling, and Judge
Sherwood, who wrote the opinion in State ex rel. v. Smith, supra,
joined in this dissent. Both he and Judge Thomas concurred in
the dissenting opinion of Gantt, J., in State ex rel. v. Smith"° ,
where the following significant language appears:
"Section 8 provides: 'The Supreme Court shall have superintending control over the courts of appeals by mandamus, prohibition and certiorari!' The history of this amendment is so recent that its object is well known. Owing to the crowded condition of the docket of this court at that time, an effort was made
to relieve it by the creation of these courts of appeals. This
amendment: had two main purposes in view. One was to relieve
the overcrowded docket of this court, and to prevent delays in
the administration of justice; the other was to keep these courts
of appeals in accord with each other in their decisions, and with
the rulings of this court. Hence it is made the duty of either of
said courts when one of the judges sitting therein shall deem one
of its decisions contrary to any previous decision of any one of
said courts or of this court to certify the transcript to this court.
7. (1911) 238 Mo. 189, 142 S. W. 340.
8. (1916) 264 Mo. 1. c. 681-2, 188 S. W. 101.
9. (1890) 101 Mo. 174, 14 S. W. 108.
10. (1891) 107 Mo. 1. c. 533, 16 S. W. 401.
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"Previous to the adoption of this amendment an appeal
would lie from the St. Louis Court of Appeals to this court.
It seems clear that the legislature when it submitted this amendment and the people when they adopted it, intended and designed
that every citizen and litigant should have the equal protection
of the law within this state, and there should be uniformity in
the administration of justice. Had it been understood that one
tribunal in the eastern portion of the state could declare the law
one way and another tribunal in the western portion, another
way, and that no provision was made to prevent such a result,
in our opinion the amendment would have been defeated. But
the sixth section commended it to the bar and the people alike,
because by it it was thought a simple mode was provided to insure uniformity in the decisions of all the courts; and to provide
against oversight or error this court was made the final arbiter,
with power of superintendence over all inferior courts, and courts
of appeal especially, with power to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition and certiorari."
It is true that this case was a mandamus case against a
court of appeals, but the reasoning of the matter is pertinent here.
These three members of the court as then constituted, Sherwood,
C. J., Gantt and Thomas, JJ., were of the opinion that one of
the purposes of the amendment of the constitution in 1884 was
to secure harmony in the law and in the judicial opinions of the
state. They went so far as to say that such amendment would
not have been adopted, but for this understanding. The significant portion of Judge Gantt's opinion is in the words: "and to
provide against oversight or error this court was made the final
arbiter, with power of supervision over all inferior courts, and
courts of appeals especially, with power to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari."
It must be borne in mind that he was discussing a case
wherein there was an alleged conflict of opinions 'between the
Supreme Court and one of the Courts of Appeals. So that it will
be seen that the rule announced, which precluded the Supreme
Court from reaching the Courts of Appeals when there was con-
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flict of opinions was not one established in unanimity of thought
among the judges. Suffice it to say that it was established and
remained until the Curtis case -mentioned before. The writer
had the pleasure of being admitted to the bar by Judge Gantt
whilst he was a circuit judge and lived within the same circuit
in adjoining counties. I served upon the supreme bench with
him later, and know that he never gave sanction to the first rule,
but followed it beca*use it had been announced by the majority.
No judge of the Supreme Court would have been more gratified at the rule now prevailing and first announced in the Curtis
case, than Judge Gantt, had he served long enough to have participated in the Curtis case. I feel that I can authoritatively say
that he never departed from the views expressed in his dissent.
He only yielded to the majority view in later opinions. While
the first rule was not one born in unanimity of thought, the same
can be said of the rule having its origin in the Curtis case. There
has been, and there is now, diversity of thought upon the propriety of our present writ of certiorari among the judges of the
Suprer'e Court. This appears from the opinion of Woodson, C.
J., in State ex rel. v. Robertson", where he announces for the
first time h-s submission to the present rule, rather than his acquiescence therein. From the announcement of the principles to
the effect that the Supreme Court could and would, under its
writ of certiorari, bring before it the opinion of a court of appeals, and quash said opinion and the judgment founded thereon,
as expressed first in the Curtis case, there was a long drawn out
fight for the-maintenance of the rule. Every time a new face
appeared upon the Supreme Court, interested lawyers renewed
this fight, but it finally culminated in the case of State ex rel. v.
Robertson, supra, wherein Woodson, C. J. yielded his personal
views to those of the majority, and wherein by four concurrences, the separate concurring opinion of the writer once for
all, again announced the fact that under the superintending control given the Supreme Court .by the Constitution, such court
could by its writ of certiorari bring before it the record (which
11.

(1916)

264 Mo. 1. c. 668, 188 S. W. 101.

CERTIORARI

IN

MISSOURI

under the constitution, sec. 15, art. 6 includes the opinion) of a
court of appeals, and quash such record, including both the opinion and judgment entered thereon. Since this case there has
been substantial unamimity of opinion in the Supreme Court.
I say substantial, because it should be noted that our lamented
Judge Bond to the day of his death opposed this assertion of
power of the Supreme Court. The reasons for the rule I shall
discuss but slightly, because I exhausted my thought upon that
question in State ex rel v. Robertson12 , and those interested can
read for themselves.
Before passing to the reasons for the present rule it will
not be improper, I trust, for me to say that I came to the Supreme Court thoroughly convinced that the Supreme Court not
only had the constitutional power and right to review the opinions of the courts of appeals, to determine the question of conflict, but that it was its constitutional duty so to do, notwithstanding the increase of work that would be imposed. I found, however, that there were different views existing among the members.
There were those who denied that the right existed. There was at
least one, whom I have mentioned, who in innermost thought
was opposed to the old rule, as indicated by the. dissent from
which I have quoted, and there were others who opposed a
change of the then existing rule, without assigning further reason
than its long existence. But smouldering fires need but a slight
gust of wind to produce the flame. Curtis"' case was the gust of
wind.
Curtis had sued Sexton in the Jackson County Circuit Court',
and being forced to a nonsuit, nisi, he appealed to the Supreme
Court 14 . Judge Valliant wrote the opinion and ruled that Curtis
had adduced sufficient evidence to take his case to the jury, and
reversed and remanded the cause. Upon a retrial Curtis obtaintained a judgment but in the meantime the jurisdictional amounts
12.
13.

(1916) 264 Mo.. 1. c. 671, 188 S. W. 101.
State ex reL. Curtis v. Broaddus (1911) 238 Mo. 189, 142 S. W.

340.
14. Curtisv. Sexton (1907)

201 Mo. 217, 100 S. W. 17.
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had been changed, and the next appeal went to the proper court
of appeals. Although the evidence was substantially the same,
that court reversed the case on the ground that a demurrer to
the evidence should have been given, and also refused to certify
to the Supreme Court, although asked so to do upon the ground
that their ruling conflicted with the ruling of the Supreme Court.
This was the straw which broke the camel's back.
Councel in later cases undertook to argue that we meant,
by the ruling in State ex rel. v. Broaddus15 , to say that the Supreme Court would only issue its writ of certiorari to courts of
appeals in cases where the Supreme Court had once heard the
particular case. These arguments fell upon deaf ears, and the
rule was adhered to just as we have it now.
There is an able, exhaustive, and instructive resume of all
the Supreme Court cases from the above case up to August, 1916,
in 13 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, pages 30 to 75 inclusive.
Its author is the Hon. J. P. McBaine, now Dean of the Law Department of the Missouri State University. One will read this
article with much pleasure and profit.
III.
REASONS FOR THE PRESENT RULE
Having been a part and parcel of the majority in the Supreme Court which first established the present rule as to certiorari to the courts of appeals, I hope to be able to assign to
you satisfactory reasons for this present day rule. As stated, I
shall be ,brief upon this point, because I have pointed to the case
where I have fully discussed the reasons-not as ably as it
might have been, but with such power as I possessed. My time,
then, as it has been in the preparation of these notes, was limited.
But to the reasons for the present rule. By the original constitution of 18:75, sec. 3 art. VI, the Supreme Court was given the
power and -right of "a general superintending control over all
inferior courts". By the same section the Supreme Court was
15.

(1911)

238 Mo. 189, 142 S. W. 340.
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granted the power "to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus,
quo warranto, certiorari and other original remedial writs, and
to hear and determine the same." By section 12 of art. VI of
this original constitution the St. Louis Court of Appeals was
created, but it should be noted that there was no provision requiring that court to follow the last controlling opinion of the
Supreme Court. This is no doubt accounted for, in part, by the
fact that in the more important cases to be disposed of by that
court an appeal or writ of error would lie to the Supreme Court.
But in 1884, when by amendment to the constitution, a system
of courts of appeals was provided for, the framers of the amendment had looked into the future and bethought themselves of
what might happen. By this amendment the field of action of
the St. Louis Court of Appeals was broadened, the Kansas City
Court of Appeals created, and provision made for the establishment of a third court of the same class 16. Section 6 of the
amendment of 1884, provides:
"When any one of said courts of appeals shall in any cause
or proceeding render a decision which any one of the judges
therein sitting shall deem contrary to any previous decision
of any one of said courts of appeals, or of the Supreme Court,
the said Court of Appeals must, of its own motion, pending the
same term and not afterward, certify and transfer said cause or
proceeding and the original transcript therein to the Supreme
Court, and thereupon the Supreme Court must rehear and determine said cause or proceeding, as in case of jurisdiction obtained by ordinary appellate process; and the last previous .rulings of the Supreme Court on any question of law or equity
shall, in all cases, be controlling authority in said courts of appeals."
Then, for fear that the original constitution had not made
the right and power of the Supreme Court clear this amendment of 1884, by section 8 thereof provided: "The Supreme
Court shall have superintending control over the courts of appeals by mandamus, prohibition and certiorari."
16.

Secs. 1, 2 and 3 of the amendment of 1884.
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By referring to section 6, it will be seen that the last clause
thereof reads: "and the last previous rulings of the Supreme
Court on any question of law or equity shall, in all cases, be
controlling authority in said courts of appeals." It was those
provisions that Judge Gantt had before him in State ex rel. v.
Smith17 , when he said: "It seems clear that the legislature when
it submitted this amendment, and the people when they adopted
it, intended and designed that every citizen and litigant should
have the equal protection of the law within this state, and there
should be uniformity in the administration of justice. Had it
been understood that one tribunal in the eastern portion of the
state could. declare the law one way and another tribunal in the
western portion another way, and that no provision was made to
prevent such a result, in our opinion the amendment would have
been defeated. But the sixth section commended it to the bar
and the people alike, because by it it was thought a simple mode
was provided to insure uniformity in the decision of all the
courts." l-ie meant by "all the courts" not only the courts of
appeals, but the Supreme Court as well, for he closes the paragraph with these enlightening words: "and to provide against
over-sight or error this court (the Supreme Court) was made
the final arbiter, with power of superintendence over all inferior
courts, and courts of appeal especially, with power to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari."
The idea is that by the amended constitution we were adopting a system of appellate courts, with the Supreme Court at the
head thereof, and with a superintending control of those courts
by the Supreme Court. Throughout the whole thread of this
amended constitution runs the thought of uniformity in the
case law of the state as announced by the several appellate courts.
The courts of appeals were to be guided in their opinions by the
last previous rulings of the Supreme Court. This was provided
because there could be no harmony in the base law without it.
To reach this end two methods were provided: (1) a judge of
the court of appeals could say that the majority opinion of that
17.

(1891)

107 Mo. 1. c. 533, 16 S. W. 401.
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court conflicted with certain opinions of the Supreme Court, or
of another court of appeals, and ask that cause be certified to
the Supreme Court for final determination; or, (2) in the event,
using the language of Judge Gantt, by "oversight or error" the
courts of appeals failed to follow the last rulings of the Supreme
Court, then by certiorarithat court could correct the conflict, and
preserve the harmony of the law. Judge Gantt uses the term,
"oversight or error" but may we 'be permitted to suppose a flagrant case? Suppose a court of appeals passed upon a'case, otherwise within its jurisdiction, and openly said that their opinion
did not accord with the last rulings of the Supreme Court, but
failed to certify such case to the Supreme Court, what would become of harmony in the case law, if the Supreme Court could
not bring before it, by certiorari, the record in that case, and
upon a hearing quash such record?
Judge Bond, with great diligence, has collected all the cases
supporting the old rule in his dissenting opinion in State ex rel.
v. Robertson 8 . Those cases will be searched in vain for an)'
serious discussion of that portion of section 6 of the amendment
of 1884, which reads: "And the last previous rulings of the
Supreme Court on any question of law or equity shall, in all
cases, be controlling authority in said courts of appeals." Those
cases proceed upon the erroneous theory, that simply because
the particular case fell within the appellate jurisdiction of a
court of appeals, such court could in the face of the last quoted
clause of the constitution, decide the case by announcing rulings
of law or equity contrary to the last previous rulings of the Supreme Court upon the same questions. In other words those
cases gave no effect whatever to the last clause of section 6 of
the amendment of 1884. According to those cases there was left
to the courts of appeals alone the power bf determining whether
or not there was conflict of opinion between them and the Supreme Court. As a practicing lawyer the rule of those cases
grated upon my better judgment, and I never could bring to my
18.

(1916)

264 Mo. 1. c. 681-2, 188 S. W. 101.
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legal conscience an acquiescence in the law announced in those
cases.
It was a useless act for the framers of the amendment of
1884 to make the last previous rulings of the Supreme Court
controlling upon the courts of appeals, if other portions of the
instrument did not give to the Supreme Court power to enforce
this constitutional provision as against the courts of appeals.
Our view is that this power was specifically granted by section
8 of the amendment of 1884, wherein it is said: "The Supreme
Court shall have superintending control over the courts of appeals by mandamus, prohibition and certiorari." In other words,
if such a court refuses to hear and determine a case which it
should hear and determine, the Supreme Court by mandamus
can compel it to act. If such court assumes jurisdiction and
threatens to determine a case contrary to the constitution and
law, the Supreme Court can prohibit such threatened action.
And, if such court has determined a case in violation of the constitution and law, the Supreme Court by its writ of certiorari
can bring before it the record and upon a hearing quash such
record.
In what I have just written I have had in view the purpose
of the writ of certiorari as announced by the authorities, i. e.
"The purpose of the writ is to have the entire record of the inferior tribunal brought before the Supreme Court, to determine
whether the former had jurisdiction or had exceeded its jurisdiction or 'had failed to proceed according to the essential requirements of the law." I must add that the constitution is a
vital part of the law.
Both the old rule and the present rule of the Supreme Court
are in accord on the question that the record and judgment of a
court of appeals, upon certiorari, can be quashed by the Supreme
Court, if the court of appeals was without jurisdiction in the
first instance. The difference between the two rules lies within
the latter portion of the quotation given in the preceding paragraph. The present rule proceeds upon the theory that a court of
appeals may have jurisdiction in the first instance, but in the
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course of its proceedings it may violate the constitution, and
thereby act in excess of its lawful jurisdiction. Such is the
case when such a court, in deciding a case, otherwise within its
lawful power, acts beyond its jurisdiction when it either fails or
refuses to recognize the last previous ruling of the Supreme
Court as controlling. The constitution says that such last previous ruling of the Supreme Court shall be controlling, and when
a court of appeals violates this provision, it gets 'beyond its lawful jurisdiction and authority in the particular case.
To be plain, the constitution has fixed an orbit in which
these courts must travel in the disposition of the cases properly
before them. Following the last previous ruling of the Supreme
Court is a constitutional provision which must be obeyed, if the
courts of appeals would travel in the orbit fixed for them by the
amendment of 1884. They are acting in excess of their lawful
powers when they ignore this provision of the constitution, and
their record should be quashed upon certiorari. In conclusion
it will suffice to say that the Supreme Court has the constitutional
power to determine an alleged conflict of opinions, and to quash
the opinion of a court of appeals, if such opinion conflicts with
previous rulings of the Supreme Court. Harmony in the case
law cannot otherwise be attained.

IV.
THE PRACTICE
To the beginner in the law, the practice is a thing of first
importance. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated to the
bar that the granting of the writ of certiorari is purely discretionary". It was such at the common law and our rule comports
with that of the common law.
Limiting our discussion to the writ of certiorari as used by
the Supreme Court against the courts of appeals in the interest
of uniformity of the law, it must be said that the practice is gov19. State ex rel. Gardner v. Hall (1920) 282 Mo. 425, 221 S. W.
708; State ex rel. v. Ellison (1921) 230 S. W. 970.
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erned, (1) by the rules of the Supreme Court, and (2) by the
case-made law since the case of State ex rel. v. Broaddus 20 .

The applicable rules are Nos. 32, 33 and 34 of the present
revised rules of the Supreme Court, which rules are printed at
the end of each volume of the reports. The first two rules (32
and 33) have but general application. Thus rule 32 provides
that no remedial writ will be granted when the party has adequate
relief by appeal or writ of error. By rule 33 it is indicated that
oral arguments will not be heard on applications for remedial
writs, and this applies to applications or petitions for the writ
of certiorari. This rule also provides that if a remedial writ is
granted, then upon final hearing "printed abstracts and briefs
shall be filed in all respects as is required in appeals and writs
of error in ordinary cases". This rule should be noted, because
lawyers of long experience have, a few times, overlooked the
fact that a printed abstract was required in a certain case. This
rule applies to certiorari and must be observed.
Rule 34 is one which applies specifiically to applications for
the writ of certiorari, which we have under discussion. The rule
requires, (1) a notice of five days to the opposite party, or parties adversely affected, (2) that the petition or application shall
not exceed five pages, in which counsel shall "concisely set out
the issue presented to the court of appeals and show wherein and
in what manner the alleged conflicting ruling arose, and shall
designate the precise place in our official reports where the controlling decision will be found "and (3) such petition shall be
accompan'ed by, (a) copy of the court of appeal's opinion complained of in the petition, (b) copy of motion for rehearing, or
to transfer to the Supreme Court, with copy of the rulings upon
such motion or motions by the court of appeals, (c) suggestions
in support of the petition or application, which shall not exceed
six typewritten or printed pages. The notice which the rule
requires to be given to the party adversely interested must be
accompanied by a true copy of the petition and all the exhibits
and suggestions. The adverse party may file suggestions in op20.

(1911)

238 Mo. 189, 142 S. W. 340.
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position to the granting of the writ at any time prior to the date
fixed by the notice as the time for the presentation of the application or petition for the writ. These suggestions must be limited to five pages. The purpose of this rule is obvious. If there
is a real conflict of opinion, it does not require a volume of matter to state it.

Some lawyers imagine, or seem to imagine, that

verbosity is an evidence of erudition, but quite the contrary is
true. The real legal mind is full of thought and substance with
the power to express it in precise and brief terms.
One suggestibn may not be out of the way here. An application for the writ should concisely show the issues, nisi, and
the issues in the court of appeals. Further, it should be shown
in the fewest apt words the ruling or rulings of that court which
conflict with those of the Supreme Court, pointing to the case
or cases by book and page. One should not endeavor to find a
great number of conflicts, but find the real conflicts, if such
there be. Too many lawyers proceed upon the. drag-net theory.
If one has a case of real conflict he should state it and quit. It
requires the time of the court to winnow the grain from the
chaff in these drag-net applications. A lawyer should not drift
into the habit of preparing such applications. Nor should he
be disappointed if the court is unable to discern conflict even in
what he considers a real conflict. Great minds often differ. It
is safe to say that there is about one application granted to where
there are seven to nine refused.
Another matter of interest is that if the court has in mind
a case decided by the Supreme Court, which does in fact conflict
with that of the court of appeals, the court will make use of its
own knowledge, and in the disposition of the certiorari case, will
use the case of which it has knowledge, although not called to
the court's attention in the briefs. This is done on the theory
that real harmony of the law is the chief purpose of the writ
now under consideration.
The practice of the Supreme Court under its rules and the
law is to be found in cases since the Curtis case. The rules of
court indicate no limit of time within which petitions' or appli-
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cations for the writ may be filed. There is no statute upon the
subject in Missouri. So, a rule of law had to be established upon
that question. This was to have been expected in the earlier cases,
but it did not come forth, 'because the question was not raised
by counsel until the recent case of State ex rel. Berkshire v. Ellison". In that case the writ of certiorari was quashed because
of laches. In other words, the court ruled that the application
upon which the writ was issued was not timely made. The
further ruling was that a period of thirty days from the time
the motion for rehearing was overruled by the court of appeals,
was, to say the least, a reasonable time within which to make
application for the writ, and that due diligence would require
notice of an intended application even earlier. The reasons for
this rule may be gathered from the opinion in Berkshire's case.
The most important question in the matter of practice (and
not mentioned in the rules of court) is just what will 'be considered by the court in the final disposition of the case. There
were, and are now, members of the court entertaining the view
that we should consider the whole record before the court of
appeals, including the evidence preserved in the bill of exceptions. This view has some sustaining auth6rity in the common
law practice. The court has finally settled the matter 'by holding
that it will look solely to the opinion of the court of appeals
for the evidentiary facts, indulging the presumption that such
court has stated the facts in its opinion2 . It was not long before division arose as to whether a written document if mentioned in the opinion could be considered as a part of the opinion
of the court of appeals. Prior to Wahl's case it had been ruled
that such documents would be considered"2 . The peculiar language of Wahl's case became a disturbing factor. The lamented
21. (1921) 230 S. W. 970.
22. State ex rel. Wahl v. Reynolds (1917)

272 Mo. 588, 199 S. W.

978..
23. State ex rel. v. Ellison (1915) 176 S. W. 1. c. 12; State ex rel. v.
Robertson (1916) 264 Mo. 661, 188 S. W. 1. c. 102; State ex rel. v. Ellison
(1916) 191 S. W. 1. c. 53.
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Judge Bond, with an eye singly directed to the curbing of the
power of the Supreme Court in these certiorari cases, used this
language: "Nor does it (the court's rule of review) embrace
any consideration of the record of the case in the court of appeals further than the same is set forth in the opinion under review." "Set forth" in the record might have a very restricted
meaning, and I have no doubt (knowing as I do the views of
Judge Bond) that he used the words in the most restrictive
sense. He meant, (leaving out of consideration what construction
those who agreed with him gave to the words) that if the opinion
mentioned an instruction, but did not set it out in the opinion
in substance or in haec verba, the Supreme Court could not look
at that instruction. These unfortunate words "set forth" occasioned another review of the cases in State ex rel. Kansas City
v. Ellison 24 . There the applicable case law was collated, and the
rule was finally announced that the Supreme Court would take
the facts from the court of appeals opinion for the evidentiary
'facts of the case, but would also examine any written document
mentioned in the opinion, although not "set forth" in the opinion. This is for the sound reason that the mention of such written instruments (which includes instructions) made such written instruments just as much a part of the opinion, as if 'they
were fully written out therein. This is a sensible rule, and it
works toward the ends of exact justice. A court of appeals cannot well write an opinion without making some reference to the
pleadings and the several contested instructions. Under the
present rule the real question of conflict can be determined with
certainty.
Finally, upon the determination of the case upon certiorari,
the Supreme Court either quashes the record of the court of
appeals, or quashes its own writ. The latter action leaves the
action of the court of appeals undisturbed. If the record of the
court of appeals is quashed, the original case is left pending
there as if it had never been determined, but in the future deter24.

(1920) 220 S. W. 498.
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mination of the cause, such court would be bound by the opinion
of the Supreme Court in the certiorari proceedings. The Supreme Court renders no judgment in the particular case, which
has been the occasion of the certiorari proceeding.
W. W. GRAVES

Jefferson City, Missouri.

